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This paper asks whether tax cycles or tax smoothing represents the optimal policy in models
without any extrinsic uncertainty. To answer this question, I develop a general framework for studying
tax cycles in a large class of models that feature various types of frictions. This framework adds various
wedges, resembling tax wedges, to the labour market, to the product market, and to money acquisition
into an otherwise frictionless economy, so that it nests a large class of models used for policy analysis.
I derive a criterion for this general framework that indicates when cycles are welfare-improving in
a frictionless economy, and why frictions make cycles more likely to be optimal. I then calibrate
two models with frictions, a labour search model and a monetary model, and show that cycles are
welfare-improving under standard preferences.
1. INTRODUCTION
In a seminal paper, Barro (1979) suggests that tax smoothing is the optimal policy if
distortionary taxes are the sole option. In this paper I show that this is not always the case.
Instead, some time variation in levying taxes can improve welfare, both in Walrasian settings
and in models with frictions. I also demonstrate that frictions that are regarded as important in
many macroeconomic models enlarge the set of parameter values–encompassing values that
are considered standard–for which tax cycles lead to higher welfare.
There is a simple explanation for the optimality of tax cycles in a model with no extrinsic
uncertainty. The Ramsey planner takes into account that a change in tax rates changes the
price of consumption and thus interest rates. The consumption Euler equation implies that a
tax cut today, financed through more debt and repaid next period, lowers the interest rate.
A cycle is optimal whenever this drop in interest rates relaxes the government’s budget
sufficiently to compensate for the welfare loss from the induced variation in consumption
and hours. Technically, the reason is the potential non-convexity of the Ramsey optimization
problem. First-order conditions are then not sufficient to characterize the optimum: the first-
order approach is invalid and a cycle improves welfare.
To study the optimality of tax cycles I develop a general framework that allows for various
wedges in a frictionless prototype economy and nests a large class of models. The wedges distort
agents’ decisions in the labour market and the product market, and their decisions to acquire
money. In this framework, I develop a general condition, applicable to Walrasian settings and
to models with frictions, that indicates when a tax cycle generates higher welfare than tax
smoothing does. This criterion can be expressed in terms of the primitives that characterize the
economy–preferences, the size of the government and the wedges–which emphasizes the role
of frictions in generating optimal tax cycles.
I then apply this framework to various economies that are nested in the general framework
and that provide interesting applications of the general principle. First I consider Walrasian
settings, nested in the general framework, when all frictions are shut down. These frictionless
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economies serve as an overall benchmark for analysing the role of frictions. They also isolate
the role of preferences in generating optimal cycles. I show that two classes of preferences exist,
with different implications. One class implies that tax smoothing is optimal, whereas within the
other class, tax cycles improve welfare. With separability between consumption and leisure,
these two classes can be characterized fully and sharply. Under (weakly) increasing relative
risk aversion (IRRA) in consumption1 tax smoothing is optimal, whereas under sufficiently
strongly decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) tax cycles become optimal. Interestingly,
DRRA is found to be the empirically relevant specification (for example, Ogaki and Zhang,
2001).2
Next I study whether frictions of various types in the labour market and in money
acquisition, which are incorporated in many models, increase or decrease the range of
preferences leading to optimal tax cycles. To answer this question, I make use of the various
model economies with frictions nested in my framework. The theoretical results allow me to
introduce the frictions one at a time in order to study these in isolation. For each of the frictions
I theoretically characterize when a cycle improves welfare. Using calibrated examples I show
that tax cycles are optimal under standard preferences.
As an example of labour market frictions, I consider optimal taxation in the Pissarides
(1985, 2000) search and matching model.3 A non-trivial wedge arises because of search
frictions that require firms to post vacancies to create employment, and wages to be formed
through bargaining. When the model is calibrated in a standard way, I find that cycles become
optimal for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). As an example of frictions in money
acquisition, I consider the Lagos and Wright (2005) model. A non-trivial wedge arises also
in this model, since money is used in a product market with search frictions and the price
of these transactions depends on the trading volume. In a parameterized example I find that
cycles can improve welfare for CRRA preferences regardless of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion.
Exactly the same wedges characterizing these simple models are present also in much
richer models used for policy analysis. The possibility of tax cycles being optimal in these
more complete models cannot be ruled out a priori and the belief that restricting oneself to
IRRA or even CRRA could rule out tax cycles is not warranted. Cycles can improve welfare
even in a simple model, one that is not very different from a Walrasian world.4
Further, I can partially characterize the shape of the optimal policy. An optimal policy
(after the initial period) can be implemented by at most two different tax rates. The optimal
policy is either constant or discontinuous. In particular, it is not necessarily differentiable
as Chamley (1986) assumes in order to verify that cycles are not optimal. The welfare
gains from implementing such a cycle can be substantial. They are, in terms of consumption
equivalents, about 0.5% in the search and matching economy, equal to about 4% in the Lagos
1. What matters here is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, although the preferences (DRRA, CRRA,
IRRA) are classified according to their risk aversion.
2. Ogaki and Zhang (2001) reject CRRA and favour DRRA, although no consensus on the magnitude of DRRA
has yet been reached. Furthermore, Vissing-Jorgenson (2002) provides evidence that richer households have a higher
elasticity of intertemporal substitution than do poorer ones. For this type of preferences, this implies that risk aversion
decreases with wealth. See Gollier (2001) for a further discussion of DRRA and references to the literature.
3. Following the Ramsey approach, the government issues bonds and levies a linear labour tax rate. For a
different approach to taxation in a search and matching model based on informational frictions (following Mirrlees,
1971) see Hungerbu¨hler et al. (2006).
4. Hassler et al. (2008) show that optimal capital income tax rates oscillate in a model without geometric
depreciation of capital. However, their paper differs from mine in that they do not consider labour taxes, that the
reason for oscillations of capital income tax rates are different, and that oscillations generically die out.
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and Wright (2005) model, and can be arbitrarily large in the frictionless case with DRRA
preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present a simple
model that provides the intuition and formalizes the role of frictions. Section 3 describes the
general framework for analysing optimal taxation in models with and without frictions, and
Section 4 considers the optimal policy in this framework. Section 5 applies these general results
to a frictionless economy and Section 6 analyses models with frictions. Section 7 concludes
by summarizing the results. All proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
2. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
To formalize the intuition from the introduction, I now present a simple, two-period model of
the labour market. The simple model illustrates which properties of frictions make tax cycles
a welfare-improving policy.
Each period, vacancies h are posted at a resource cost κ to create employment x = m(h) =
h0.5
10 , which is used to produce c = x − κh consumption goods. All workers are unemployed at
the beginning of each period. The measure one of households values consumption according
to the utility function
c1−σ1 − 1
1 − σ +
c1−σ2 − 1
1 − σ , (1)
where σ > 0. Concerning the market structure, I consider two scenarios. One has competitive
markets with Walrasian pricing; the other is characterized by search frictions. In the first
scenario, m is a technology to create output xt , which is traded in a competitive market at a
price wCt . In the second scenario, search frictions make filling a job costly. Once a firm pays
the cost for a vacancy and meets a worker, the wage wSt is determined through bargaining. The
government can issue bonds B1 in period 1 with a gross return R1 and it can levy a tax τ t so
that the after-tax price equals (1 − τ t )wit , i ∈ {C, S}. Government expenditures are zero.
In the economy with search frictions, not all vacancies are matched with unemployed
workers. Another key feature of the search economy is that the worker’s threat point (or
outside option) b is strictly lower than the worker’s after-tax productivity 1 − τ t . For matched
worker–firm pairs it is thus in their mutual interest to produce and to agree on a wage which
lies in the interval [b, 1 − τ t ]. Bargaining between the worker and the firm determines a wage
from within this interval, which as in Hall and Milgrom (2008) equals5
wSt =
1
2
(
1 + b
1 − τ t
)
. (2)
Firms make profits 1 − wSt = 12 (1 − b1−τ t ) and they anticipate the outcome of bargaining when
they post vacancies. The number of meetings between firms and workers equals m so that each
vacancy is filled with probability m
h
. Free entry of firms implies that expected profits of firms
equal zero:
κht = m(ht )12
(
1 − b
1 − τ t
)
. (3)
5. The net wage equals wSt (1 − τ t ) = 12 (1 − τ t + b).
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Figure 1
Optimal taxation with two periods
The government’s intertemporal budget constraint expressed in terms of allocations, taking the
consumption Euler equation R1 = c
σ
2
cσ1
and the resource constraint into account, reads
(m(h1) − κh1)−σ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
CS(h1):=
+ (m(h2) − κh2)−σ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
CS(h2):=
= 0, (4)
where  := (m(h) − κh)
(
1 − bm(h)
m(h)−2κh
)
is instantaneous tax revenue.6
The question now is whether a welfare-maximizing government chooses the same tax rate
τTI = 0 in both periods or whether time-variation in tax rates improves welfare. The equilibrium
conditions–the free entry condition and the resource constraint–imply that choosing τ is
equivalent to choosing h. In particular, time variation in τ is optimal if and only if time
variation in h is optimal.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the conditions that can render time variation optimal. First-
period vacancies h1 are on the x-axis and second-period vacancies h2 on the y-axis. The efficient
level of vacancies is denoted h∗. The solid line is the indifference curve of the representative
household through the point (hTI, hTI). Allocations with more vacancies h generate higher
utility as long as h is smaller than h∗. The graph also shows curves in the (h1, h2) space
which generate the same tax revenue as (hTI, hTI). There are three possibilities for the shape
of this curve. In Case (I ) the curve is concave. In Case (II) the curve is convex but “less
6. Solving the free entry condition for the tax rate gives τ = 1 − bm
m−2κh and thus w
Sm = 12
(
1 + m−2κh
m
)
m =
m − κh.
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Figure 2
The role of frictions
convex” than the indifference curve. In Case (III) the curve is convex and “more convex”
than the indifference curve at (hTI, hTI). In the first two cases it is optimal to choose hTI in
both periods. No combination of h1 and h2 generates the same tax revenue as (hTI, hTI) and
at the same time higher utility. In contrast, in Case (III), such a combination exists as the
arrow identifies an allocation, which is located above the indifference curve but below the tax
revenue curve.
As is evident from the graphical representation, Case (III) is possible only if tax revenue
is sufficiently convex. I now explain why Case (III) describes the tax problem in the search
economy whereas only Cases (I ) and (II) are possible in the scenario with Walrasian pricing.
For parameter values σ = 5, b = 0.8, and κ = 0.01, panel A of Figure 2 shows period t ′s
tax revenue CS as a function of h, around the constant value hTI = 1 which balances the
government’s budget. The function is convex, which implies that a tax cycle is implementable:
increasing h1 (through decreasing taxes and issuing debt) and decreasing h2 (due to higher
taxes) to balance the budget generate an average higher value of vacancies, h1 + h2 > 2hTI.
This is possible since such a cycle lowers the interest rate that the government has to pay on
the debt issued in period 1 (u′(c1) decreases, u′(c2) increases).
More formally, consider a second-order approximation to CS around hTI:
CS(h) = CS(hTI) + CS ′(hTI)(h − hTI) + CS ′′(hTI)(h − hTI)2. (5)
A balanced budget then requires that h1 and h2 satisfy
(h1 + h2 − 2hTI) + CS
′′(hTI)
CS ′(hTI)
(
(h1 − hTI)2 + (h2 − hTI)2
) = 0. (6)
Equation (6) implies that convexity of CS is a necessary condition for average vacancies to
increase since CS ′ < 0. The size of the difference h1 + h2 − 2hTI depends on the first- and
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second-order derivatives of CS. A higher degree of convexity (CS ′′ larger) makes a cycle more
likely, as suggested by the graphical analysis. A flatter tax revenue function (∣∣CS ′∣∣ smaller)
also increases the average level of h1 + h2, as large changes in h lead to small revenue losses.
Once we establish that a cycle is feasible, we also want to know whether it increases
welfare. The benefit of a cycle is that employment increases; the loss is that it leads to
higher consumption volatility. In the parameterized economy, the increase in employment
indeed is sufficiently large to outweigh the losses. Increasing h1 by 10% makes it necessary
to decrease h2 = 0.93, which leads to consumption levels c1 = 0.094 and c2 = 0.087 (cTI =
m(hTI) − κhTI = 0.09) and to a welfare gain expressed in consumption equivalents of 0.15%.
The optimal policy leads to even larger welfare gains of 8.1%, as it implements h1 = 7.42 and
h2 = 0.82.
To understand the role of frictions, consider now the corresponding model with Walrasian
pricing. In this scenario, output is traded at a price wC = 1, and vacancies are chosen to
maximize (1 − τ )wCm(h) − κh, which results in the after-tax price (1 − τ)wC = (1 − τ ) =
2κh
m(h)
and thus
CSC(ht ) = (m(ht ) − κht )−σ (m(ht ) − 2κht ), (7)
where instantaneous tax revenue C = τwCm(h) = m(h)−2κh
m(h)
m(h) = m(h) − 2κh.
With Walrasian pricing, finding out whether a cycle can improve upon a constant allocation
is simple. The first welfare theorem implies that a cycle is not optimal, as it applies to the
Walrasian market setting but not to the search economy. Nevertheless, it is instructive to look at
the shape of CSC . Plotting CSC around the efficient vC,∗ = 25 (panel B of Figure 2) establishes
that this function is not convex as it is for the search economy, so that a cycle does not increase
the average number of vacancies, a prerequisite for a cycle to improve welfare. The function
CSC , however, is convex at lower values of h, but the economy is located on the “wrong side”
of the Laffer curve in this case (CSC is upward sloping). In particular, CSC is increasing at
h∗ = 1. Such a high degree of inefficiency is feasible owing only to the frictions of the search
economy, and not through a high value of government expenditures.7
As the subsequent sections will establish, the different properties of the two market settings
are characterized by the wedge
ω =
b
2
(
1 + m(h)
m(h)−2κh
)
2κh
, (8)
the ratio between after-tax labour income in the search economy and the Walrasian market
setting. The properties of the wedge (level, first and second derivative) reflect the arguments
discussed above. First, the level of this wedge describes the inefficiencies that lead to lower
employment, as does a tax wedge. The larger the wedge is, the larger the inefficiencies are and
the more likely a cycle becomes. Second, the shape of the wedge changes the shape of tax
revenues (without changing utility). Specifically, the first and second derivatives of ω change
CS′′
CS′ and thus the likelihood of a tax cycle as shown in equation (6). As is illustrated in panel
C of Figure 2, the wedge is decreasing and convex so that ω′′
ω′ is negative and thus
CS′′
CS′ is
lower relative to the Walrasian setting. As shown in equation (6), this implies that a cycle
leads to larger tax revenues and welfare is more likely to increase. As we will see, these two
properties (decreasing and convex) are not specific to this example but characterize also other
7. The degree of inefficiencies will be substantially smaller in the calibrated search model in Section 6.1.
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economies: as the economy becomes more efficient–the number of vacancies increases–the
wedge shrinks, and the speed of this convergence slows down.
This simple example shows that cycles can improve welfare and are more likely do so in an
economy with frictions. The following sections generalize these insights. In the next section,
I develop a framework to study optimal taxation in economies which feature more general
form of frictions.
3. THE FRAMEWORK
In this section I describe the framework I use to study optimal policy both in models with and
without frictions. Since this framework nests several classes of models that differ in the way
they relate prices to allocations, I use a black box to formalize this relationship.
The economy is populated by a measure one of identical households. Each household’s
preferences over a stream of consumption, effort choices, and money holdings are described
by a utility function
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct , ht ,mt ), (9)
where ct denotes consumption, ht denotes the effort choice (labour in the Lucas and Stokey
(1983) (LS) economy), mt denotes real money holdings, and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective
discount factor. The single-period utility function u is assumed to be strictly increasing in ct ,
strictly increasing in mt for mt < m(ct , ht ) and constant for mt ≥ m(ct , ht ) (m can be ∞)
and strictly decreasing in ht , strictly concave and three times continuously differentiable. The
derivatives of period t utility with respect to c, m, and h are denoted uc(t), um(t), and uh(t),
respectively.
The wage rate is wt and is taxed at the labour tax rate τ t in period t . Households receive
an after-tax real wage rate λLt = (1 − τ t )wt for providing effort h. Whereas in a Walrasian
economy λLt = −uhuc = (1 − τ t )wt , frictions can invalidate these equalities, for example, as in
the search economy in Section 2. The effort choice ht is transformed into consumption goods
through a linear technology F(h) = h at a resource cost γ (h).8 Firms choose ht to maximize
real profits 
(ht , wt ), which are fully taxed away.
In each period t ≥ 0, households can buy one-period nominal government bonds Bt , which
earn a nominal return Rt . Households also hold nominal money Mt , which at a price level Pt is
transformed into real balances mt = MtPt . The initial price level P0 is normalized to 1. Frictions
also distort the acquisition of money, which in the presence of frictions is characterized through
λMt = uc(t)Rt−1Rt ≥ 0, instead of um(t) = uc(t)
Rt−1
Rt
as in the frictionless case. Frictions thus
drive a wedge between the opportunity cost of holding money and the marginal utility of
money.
The household’s flow budget constraint in period t ≥ 1 is given by:
Ptct + Bt + Mt ≤ Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + PtλLt ht , (10)
where Rt ≥ 0. The left-hand side of the budget constraint represents the uses of wealth:
consumption spending, bond purchases, and money acquisition. The right-hand side shows
the sources of wealth: bonds and money acquired in the previous period, plus labour income.
The household chooses {ct , Bt }∞t=0 to maximize (9), subject to (10), taking as given
{Rt , λLt , ht , Pt , λMt ,Mt }∞t=0, and initial wealth R−1B−1 + M−1.
8. A linear F is without loss of generality. For a different technology just redefine the effort choice h˜ = F(h).
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3.1. Government
The government faces a stream of unproductive public consumption gt = g. This is financed
by levying labour income taxes at a rate τ t and by issuing one-period bonds Bt and nominal
money Mt . The government’s sequential budget constraint is given by
Bt + Mt = Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Ptgt − τ tPtwtht − Pt
(ht , wt ). (11)
3.2. Equilibrium
In the most general environment, the two wedges λL and λM , depend on the whole history of
events as in the quantitative analysis in Chari et al. (2007). For a theoretical analysis, however,
this is too general and some restrictions are necessary. It seems natural to assume that the
labour market wedge depends on the same variables as the Walrasian wage, namely on ht ,
λL(ht ).
9 Similarly, the wedge in money acquisition depends on Mt/Pt only, λM(Mt/Pt ).
An equilibrium {ct , gt = g, ht , τ t , wt , λLt , λMt , Bt ,Mt , Pt , Rt }∞t=0 then satisfies the follow-
ing conditions:
ct + g + γ (h) = ht (12)
λL(ht ) = wt(1 − τ t ) (13)
Ptct + Bt + Mt = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + PtλLt ht (14)
uc(t) = β RtPt
Pt+1
uc(t + 1) (15)
λMt (mt) = uc(t)
Rt − 1
Rt
(16)
ht maximizes 
(ht , wt ) (17)
Rt ≥ 0 (18)
where (12) is the resource constraint, (13) describes an equilibrium in the labour market, (14)
is the household’s budget constraint, (15) is the consumption Euler equation, (16) describes
money demand, (17) describes firm maximization, and (18) is the zero lower bound on nominal
returns.
4. OPTIMAL DYNAMIC POLICY
In this section I consider whether implementing a constant policy is an optimal strategy for the
government. I derive a condition to check whether a cycle is superior, and prove properties of
such a non-deterministic policy.
4.1. The Ramsey problem
The Ramsey problem is the choice of an implementable allocation that maximizes welfare.
Definition 1. An allocation {ct , ht , mt }∞t=0 is implementable if {τ t , wt , λLt , λMt , Bt ,Mt, Pt ,
Rt }∞t=0 exists, such that {ct , gt = g, ht , τ t , wt , λLt , λMt , Bt ,Mt, Pt , Rt }∞t=0 is an equilibrium.
Definition 2. The Ramsey solution is the welfare-maximizing implementable allocation.
9. The resource constraint implies that consumption need not be included on top of effort h.
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I now state the Ramsey problem in its primal-form representation (Lucas and Stokey, 1983).
The basic idea is to use equilibrium conditions to express all prices and taxes as functions
of allocations. Only the three variables, i.e. consumption, effort, and real money holdings,
appear in the resulting primal form. This method allows all implementable allocations to be
characterized by only two equations. The first of these is the resource constraint (12). To
derive the second equation, I start with the intertemporal budget constraint of the representative
household:
∞∑
t=0
qt
[
ct + Mt − Mt−1
Pt
− λL(ht )ht
]
= R−1B−1,
where qt := Pt
∏t−1
i=0
1
Ri
. Using qt
Pt
= Rt qt+1Pt+1 and cancelling terms:
∞∑
t=0
qt
[
ct − λL(ht )ht
]+ qt+1(Rt − 1) Mt
Pt+1
= M−1 + R−1B−1.
Since the individual’s consumption Euler equation implies that
qt = βt uc(t)
uc(0)
,
and as optimal money acquisition implies
qt+1(Rt − 1)
Pt+1
= Rt − 1
Rt
qt
Pt
= βt λ
M(mt)
Ptuc(0)
,
I can substitute for qt and Rt . The budget constraint can then be written as
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
uc(t)
uc(0)
(ct − λL(ht )ht ) + λ
M(mt)
uc(0)
mt
]
= M−1 + R−1B−1,
which is equivalent to the implementability constraint
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
uc(t)(ct − λL(ht )ht ) + λM(mt )mt
] = uc(0)(M−1 + R−1B−1).
Proposition 1. For any M−1 + R−1B−1, an allocation {ct , ht , mt }∞t=0 is implementable if
and only if
uc(0)(M−1 + R−1B−1) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
uc(t)(ct − λL(ht )ht ) + λM(mt)mt
] (19)
ct + g + γ (ht ) = ht . (20)
Proof. Uses the same arguments as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) or Chari and Kehoe
(1999).
The Ramsey problem is to choose consumption ct , effort ht , and money mt to maximize (9),
subject to equations (19) and (20).10 I restrict myself to M−1 + R−1B−1 = 0 in what follows
10. An upper bound on hours and money ensures that the objective function is bounded, and I proceed under the
assumption that g is not too large, so that the set of feasible policies is not empty. The same mathematical theorems
(for example Tychonoff’s theorem) as applied in Aiyagari (1994) then imply existence.
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since this makes period t = 0 identical to all other periods (t > 0) and avoids any issues with
time inconsistency. In a real model, all results hold without this assumption. In a model with
money, it is well known (see for example, Chari and Kehoe, 1999) that it is necessary to set
M−1 + R−1B−1 = 0 to make the problem interesting (otherwise the Ramsey planner confiscates
the entire initial nominal wealth), and therefore I proceed under this assumption. ‖
4.2. A criterion for optimal cycles
A reasonable guess for a stationary problem is that a time-invariant allocation is optimal.
Definition 3. A time-invariant allocation (c, h,m) is an implementable sequence {ct =
c, ht = h,mt = m}∞t=0. An optimal time-invariant allocation (hTI, cTI, mTI) achieves the highest
welfare among all time-invariant policies.
Optimality in the definition is conditional on being time-invariant (TI).11 The next theorem
provides a condition for a TI policy not to be the solution to the Ramsey problem. Effort
supply, consumption, and money are not constant in this case. Define
CS(ht , mt) = uc(ht − g − γ (ht ), ht , mt )(ht − g − γ (ht ) − λL(ht )ht ) + λM(mt)mt ,
the current value of period t surplus and
CU(ht ,mt) = u(ht − g − γ (ht ), ht ,mt ),
the current value of period t utility.
Theorem 1. Let (hTI, cTI, mTI) be the optimal TI allocation. If either
CUh(h
TI, mTI) 	= 0 and CShh
CUhh
(hTI, mTI) − CSh
CUh
(hTI, mTI) < 0
or (∗)
CUm(h
TI, mTI) 	= 0 and CSmm
CUmm
(hTI, mTI) − CSm
CUm
(hTI, mTI) < 0
holds, then the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A welfare-improving
two-period cycle exists.12
The criterion in the theorem is equivalent to a second-order condition of the constrained
maximization problem.13 The proof of the theorem instead uses a perturbation argument to
show that a two-period cycle is welfare-improving. As will be made precise in the following
sections, condition (∗) can be rewritten in terms of primitives (preferences, wedges, and the
size of the government).
The main features of a simple time-varying policy can be conveyed in a two-period model
without money. In the first period, labour taxes are lowered and debt is issued to balance the
11. The logic of the Laffer curve implies that there are multiple TI allocations but this multiplicity does not
imply the existence of a cycle.
12. If CUhh = 0 set CShhCUhh = sgn(CShh)∞ and if CUmm = 0 set
CSmm
CUmm
= sgn(CSmm)∞.
13. Accordingly, condition (∗) is only a local test since it depends on derivatives of CU and CS at hTI only. In
particular, condition (∗) does not hold globally, so that a corner solution does not improve welfare.
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first-period budget. In the second period, the labour tax rate is increased to repay the debt (plus
interest payments). The size of the necessary tax increase in the second period depends on the
response of the real interest rate. Since labour supply and thus consumption increase in the
first period and decrease in the second period, the consumption Euler equation implies that the
real interest rate, interest payments, and the second-period tax rate decrease.
Condition (∗) reflects these arguments and indicates whether the benefits of a cycle outweigh
its costs. Since utility is concave, CUhh(CUmm) tells us how much households dislike cyclical
consumption. As in the example in Section 2, CShh(CSmm) and CSh(CSm) determine the
decrease of average tax rates and the corresponding increase in average labour supply.14 Finally,
CUh(CUm) translates this increase in labour supply into an increase in utility if hTI(mTI) is
smaller than the efficient solution.
Condition (∗) is also related to the graphical analysis in Figure 1. Mathematically, both
the tax curve and the indifference curve in Figure 1 describe h2 as a function of h1. The
second-order derivative of this function equals −CUhh
CUh
(1+1/β)
β
for the indifference curve and
−CShh
CSh
(1+1/β)
β
for the tax curve. The graphical condition–namely that the tax curve is more
convex than the indifference curve–can be expressed as −CShhh
TI
CSh
>
−CUhhhTI
CUh
and is thus
equivalent to condition (∗).
4.3. Properties of the Ramsey policy
Theorem 1 shows the non-optimality of a TI policy through the existence of an improving cycle
of length 2, but it is silent on the optimality of this cycle. The following theorem partially fills
this gap. It states that the optimal policy implements only two different allocations (h,m).
Theorem 2. The welfare of the optimal Ramsey solution can be arbitrarily well approxi-
mated by a policy that implements at most two different pairs (h,m) if β > 1/2.15
The idea of the proof is to allow for a specific kind of randomization to convexify the problem
and turn it into a linear programming problem. A well-known result in linear programming
shows that the support of the optimal (randomizing) policy is not larger than 2. It then remains
to be shown that the optimal probability distribution of labour and money can be implemented
by a sequence of tax rates. It is at this last step where, because of the specific choice of
randomization, the assumption β > 1/2 becomes relevant. An approximation is needed to rule
out an infinite number of different tax rates.
5. THE LUCAS AND STOKEY (1983) ECONOMY
Here I consider whether implementing a constant tax rate is an optimal government strategy
in the non-monetary Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy. This economy is nested in the more
general framework, as Walrasian pricing implies that λL = uh
uc
, firms maximize h − wh and
make zero profits in equilibrium, and γ ≡ 0.
14. The convexity of CS(·) is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a TI policy not to be optimal, since
otherwise first-order conditions would be sufficient to characterize the Ramsey solution. With convexity of CS, there
can be more than one solution to the first-order conditions.
15. Arbitrary approximation means that the difference between the welfare level (and the allocations) of the
optimal Ramsey policy and the welfare level of a policy with two tax rates can be made smaller than any  > 0.
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I can thus build on the general analysis in the previous section. The Ramsey problem is
then to choose {ct , ht }∞t=0 to maximize welfare subject to the implementability constraint
uc(0)R−1B−1 =
∑
t≥0
βt(uc(t) · ct + uh(t) · ht ) (21)
and the resource constraint
ct + g = ht . (22)
5.1. Time-invariant Ramsey policy
The next theorem characterizes a class of utility functions for which the optimal TI policy is
the Ramsey policy.16
Theorem 3. Let u(ct , ht ) = w(ct ) − χ(ht ) where
• w exhibits (weakly) increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) and
• χh(ht ) · ht is a convex function of ht .
Then the optimal TI policy is the Ramsey policy.
This theorem applies to classes of preferences considered by the literature (e.g. Lucas and
Stokey, 1983; Chari and Kehoe, 1999). Preference specifications for w include CRRA, CARA,
and quadratic w. Standard assumptions on primitives do not imply that χh(ht ) · ht is convex.
However, it is convex for standard choices such as χ(ht ) = α·hθt (for α > 0, θ ≥ 1), and
χ(ht ) = −(T − h)1−θ /(1 − θ) (for θ > 0 and a time endowment T ).
5.2. Time-varying Ramsey policy
The last section showed that time variation is not optimal for separable preferences that exhibit
IRRA. However, this conclusion does not necessarily hold for the presumably relevant case of
DRRA. The next theorem shows for non-separable preferences in the nested LS economy how
criterion (∗) can be expressed in terms of elasticities. I derive this condition for non-separable
preferences because it serves as a benchmark when economies with frictions are considered.
Define μ as the marginal utility of consumption, μ(h) = uc(h − g, h), χ as the marginal
disutility of labour χ = −uh(h − g, h), and f as the elasticity of a function f with respect
to h, evaluated at hTI. Let τTI be the tax rate in the optimal TI policy.
Theorem 4. For a utility function u(ct , ht ) let μ = uc, χ = −uh, and μ′, μ, χ ′, χ and
τ TI be as defined before. Then
1 + μ′μ(1 − τ
TI)2 − χ ′χ (1 − τTI)2
μ(1 − τ TI) − χ (1 − τ TI)2 +
χ (1 − τ TI) − μ(1 − τTI)
τ TI
< 0 (23)
16. This result is not trivial since the implementability constraint need not be convex (for example, as in Case
(II) in Figure 1). Furthermore, the well-known results by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), namely that steady-state
capital income tax rates are zero, do not rule out cycles either. In case the optimality criterion (∗) implies that a
(discontinuous) cycle should be implemented, a constant allocation is suboptimal. Thus a restriction to steady states
is restrictive and cannot be detected through computing dynamics (eigenvalues) around this steady state because of
the discontinuity. Furthermore, the result that non-steady-state capital income tax rates are zero (Chari and Kehoe,
1999) does not necessarily imply that labour tax rates are constant.
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implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A welfare-improving
two-period cycle exists.
Condition (23) can be simplified for separable preferences. For u(ct , ht ) = w(ct ) − χ(ht )
define κc = w′′′·cw′′ , ηc = w
′′·c
w′ , κh = χ
′′′·h
χ ′′ , and ηh = χ
′′·h
χ ′ if the denominator is not zero. If the
denominator equals zero, set κ or η to zero.
Theorem 5. Let u(ct , ht ) = w(ct ) − χ(ht ) and κc, ηc, κh, ηh and τTI be as defined
before. Then
1 + κcηc − κhηh(1 − τ
TI)2
ηc − ηh(1 − τ TI)2
+ ηh(1 − τ
TI) − ηc
τ TI
< 0 (24)
implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A welfare-improving
two-period cycle exists.
Condition (24) is identical to condition (23) except that the elasticities ηc, κc, ηh, κh are
replaced. If preferences are non-separable, households’ willingness to substitute consumption
over time not only depends on c but also on h, and the disutility of labour also depends on c
and not only on h. For separable preferences, ηc = μ(1 − τ TI), κc = μ′(1 − τ TI), ηh = χ ,
and κh = v′ , so that theorem 5 is indeed nested in theorem 4.17
If in addition to preferences being separable, χ(ht ) = A · ht –the Hansen (1985) prefer-
ences–then criterion (24) simplifies further:
Theorem 6. Let u(ct , ht ) = w(ct ) − A · ht and κc, ηc and τTI be as defined before. Then
1 + κc < ηc/τ TI (25)
implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A welfare-improving
two-period cycle exists.
DRRA is equivalent to 1 + κc ≤ ηc. The criterion (25) says that DRRA has to be sufficiently
strong. How strong depends on the size of τTI. If τTI approaches 1, a cycle would be optimal
for all DRRA preferences, whereas τ TI = 0 implies efficiency and no cycle at all. A cycle
is welfare-enhancing if a variation in consumption leads to a variation in prices that is high
enough to compensate for the household’s aversion to this variation in consumption over time,
given by w′′. Since the period t price of consumption equals w′, the size of the price variation
is high if w′′′ is high. A cycle thus improves welfare if w′′′ is large enough relative to w′′,
or equivalently if DRRA is strong enough. This reasoning is the same as in a model with
precautionary savings. In such a setting, an increase in κc, for a fixed ηc, leads to a higher
demand for precautionary savings since agents foresee that their relative risk aversion is higher
in a high tax period, and they respond by demanding more bonds. Thus they are willing to
accept a smaller return on their assets in response to a tax cycle.
The same arguments also underlie conditions (23) and (24) as sufficiently strong DRRA
leads to cycles. How strong then also depends on the curvature of the disutility of labour. In
17. Abandoning the assumption of separability between labour and consumption can render a TI policy
non-optimal even if the relative risk aversion is constant for a fixed h. This is, for example, the case when
u(c, h) = (c · (3 − h)2)(1−σ)/(1 − σ).
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TABLE 1
Welfare gains in Lucas and Stokey (1983) with HARA utility
η c
Cy
cTI
hTI h h h∗ a b
κ = −5
−0.5 0.737 0.029 0.025 0.129 0.181 −0.141 9.000
−1.0 0.013 0.343 0.306 0.440 0.614 −0.720 4.000
−1.5 0.000 0.932 0.932 0.932 1.278 −1.088 2.333
κ = −9
−0.5 9.470 0.0017 0.002 0.051 0.086 −0.017 17.000
−1.0 0.263 0.082 0.076 0.192 0.251 −0.404 8.000
−1.5 0.041 0.360 0.335 0.489 0.598 −1.093 5.000
Notes: hTI and cTI are the TI levels of h and c, h∗ is the efficient level of h, h and h are implemented in a two-period
cycle, and cCy is the constant level of c that makes the representative household indifferent between consumption
plans with and without a two-period tax cycle.
addition, κc and ηc need to be replaced in condition (23) because of non-separability. As a
result, these conditions become more complicated than condition (25), which focuses purely
on the role of DRRA.
Finally, I use the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility function
u(c, h) = (a + bc)
b−1/b
b − 1 − h, b 	= 1 (26)
to compute the welfare gains in terms of consumption equivalents for a tax rate of τ = 30%.18
As condition (25) states, cycles improve welfare only if 1 + κ > η/τ and welfare gains are
larger as 1 + κ − η/τ becomes larger, where η is risk version and κ is prudence. Table 1 shows
that welfare gains can be arbitrarily large depending on the values of η = −0.5,−1.0,−1.5
and κ = −5,−9.
So far I have characterized two classes of preferences, one for which time invariance is
optimal, and one for which it is not. A possible response could be to restrict oneself to the class
of preferences where first-order conditions are sufficient, and ignore the problem from then on.
This may be a reasonable approach if the model being studied is the LS economy, yet this
very often is not the case. Various frictions are built into models in monetary economics (for
example, Lagos and Wright, 2005) and many models incorporate a labour market with search
frictions (as in Pissarides, 2000). As the next section shows, the hope that results from the LS
economy carry over to these more elaborated models, characterized by several frictions, is not
warranted. Interestingly, I will show that the condition for cycles in the general framework is
a generalization of condition (23), which allows for a precise description of when and why
frictions cause cycles to be optimal.
6. ECONOMIES WITH FRICTIONS
In this section I consider tax cycles in economies with frictions. Applying the framework
developed in Section 3, I allow for frictions in the labour/product market and in the money
18. As in Lucas (1987), this measure is defined as the percentage compensation required to make a household
indifferent between consumption plans with and without a two-period tax cycle. Theorem 2 states that the optimal
policy implements only two different levels of vacancies, but not necessarily a two-period cycle. Numerically, however,
I was unable to find a policy that improves upon a two-period cycle.
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market. First I develop an optimality condition, nesting condition (23) in the previous section,
for an economy with a labour wedge and for an economy with a money market wedge. Then
I apply this theory to two specific economies, one a simple version of a (labour) search and
matching economy and the other a Lagos and Wright (2005) monetary model. For both types
of frictions, I find that a reasonable parametrization leads to the conclusion that cycles improve
welfare. Using the theory, I explain why this conclusion is not unexpected, and suggest therefore
that tax cycles are optimal in a large class of models with frictions. Finally, I summarize
the results and discuss monopolistic competition, a friction that does not change the welfare
properties of cycles.
6.1. Frictions in the labour market
Frictions in the labour market are characterized through a wedge ω between the after-tax wage
λL and the wage that would prevail with Walrasian pricing. To focus on the role of labour
market frictions, I consider a non-monetary model. For a utility function u(c, h) and a resource
cost γ (h), define the marginal utility of consumption
μ(h) = uc(h − g − γ (h), h) (27)
and the marginal cost of implementing employment h19
χ = −uh(h − g − γ (h), h) + uc(h − g − γ (h), h)γ ′(h). (28)
The period t wage μtλt is decomposed into the Walrasian component χt
(
= μt χtμt
)
and
the wedge ωt ,
μt(h)λt (h) = ωt(h)χt (h). (29)
Welfare CU and the surplus CS then take the following form:
CU(h) = u(h − g − γ (h), h),
CS(h) = μ(h)c(h) − ω(h)χ(h)h.
The efficiency gap  = 1 − χ
w
, which equals 0 for the efficient allocation and equals τ in
the LS economy. The elasticity of a function f with respect to h, evaluated at hTI, is again
denoted f . The resource constraint implies that c(h) = h − g − γ (h).
Theorem 7. For a utility function u(ct , ht ) and a labour wedge ω, define μ, χ ,
μ′, μ, χ ′, χ , ω′ , ω, c′ , c, and  as before. Then
μ′μ + c(2μ + c′)− χ ′χ − 2χ − ω′ω − 2ωχ − 2ω
μ − χ (1 −) <
μ − 1 + c − χ − ω

(∗L)
19. Both μ and χ are expressed as functions of h only because the resource constraint implies that consumption
c(h) = h − g − γ (h). If employment generates disutility but no resource costs (as in the LS economy), χ =
−uh(h − g − γ (h), h). If creating employment involves only resource costs and no disutility (as in a search economy),
χ = uc(h − g − γ (h), h)γ ′(h). In a Walrasian setting, the price of employment (the wage) would then equal χμ .
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implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A welfare-improving
two-period cycle exists.
Theorem 7 generalizes Theorem 4. In the case of Walrasian pricing, ω = 1, and thus ω = 0
and ω′ = 0. If in addition there are no resource costs, c = h − g, condition (∗L) simplifies to
condition (23) in the previous section.20
Two differences between economies with and without frictions determine whether a cycle is
more likely with frictions. First, the economy is less efficient if the wedge is positive (ω > 1)
as hTI is decreasing in ω. In particular, as ω > 1 implies that  is positive even if g = 0,
a cycle can improve welfare if g = 0 as shown in the example in Section 2.21 Second, the
wedge is not constant, that is ω 	= 0, ω′ 	= 0. In the search economy in Section 2, the wedge
is decreasing and convex, implying that the tax revenue curve is flatter, CShh/CSh is more
negative, and cycles are more likely. I now consider whether the results from the example
carry over to a more realistically calibrated search and matching economy.
6.1.1. A search and matching economy. I consider a search and matching model that is
nested in the general framework and that generalizes the environment in example 2. Households
derive utility u(c) from consumption c and firms post vacancies v at a resource cost κ . At
the beginning of each period, all workers are unmatched, eliminating unemployment as a state
variable. The number of matches is given by a constant returns to scale Cobb–Douglas matching
function m(1, vt ) = χ · 1αv(1−α)t = χ · v(1−α)t . The precise description of the environment is
presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. For any B−1, an allocation {ct , vt }∞t=0 is implementable if and only if
uc(0)B−1 =
∑
t≥0
βtuc(t)
[
ct − b2
m(1, vt )/vt − κ
1
2m(1, vt )/vt − κ
m(1, vt )
]
,
ct + g + κvt = m(1, vt ),
where the first equality is the implementability constraint and the second one is the resource
constraint. This model is nested in the general framework for h = m(1, v), resource costs
γ = κv, and
λL(v) = b
2
m(1, v)/v − κ
1
2m(1, v)/v − κ
. (30)
The Ramsey planner then maximizes
∑
t≥0 β
tu(ct ) over all implementable allocations.
I now consider a parameterized version of the model to check whether condition (∗L)
indicates the optimality of a cycle, using that the Walrasian component χ(v) = μ(v) κ
m′(v) and
the wedge
ω(v) = μ(v)λL(v)
χ(v)
= λL(v)m
′(v)
κ
. (31)
20. In this case, c = h − g implies c = hc = 1(1−τ) = 1(1−) , so that
2cμ−2χ
μ−χ (1−) = 21−
μ−χ (1−)
μ−χ (1−) = 21− .
21. μ − 1 + c − χ − ω is negative since the tax revenues are decreasing in h.
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TABLE 2
Parameters for cycles
α 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.65 0.7
σ 1.487 1.760 2.151 2.751 3.203 3.829
The precise model parametrization is described in the Appendix. I choose government debt
B−1 = 0, government expenditures g = 0, and the utility function is assumed to be
u(c) = c1−σ /(1 − σ),
a choice which implies no cycles in the LS economy. Table 2 reports, for every value of α,
the smallest value for σ , such that a cycle improves welfare.22
The reason why cycles are more likely in the search model than in the LS model is the
same as in the simple example from Section 2. Wage formation is different from Walrasian
pricing and the corresponding non-trivial wedge leads, for a given level of employment, to
different tax revenues. The wedge again shrinks if the allocation becomes more efficient and is
again convex since the speed of this convergence slows down, as I established in Section 2 (see
panel C of Figure 2). The same properties of wedges thus seem to characterize many search
and matching models and not only a certain example. Moreover, as I show in Section 6.2.1,
the same properties hold in the case of frictions in money acquisition. The characterization of
whether a deviation due to such a non-trivial wedge is large enough to make a cycle optimal
is shown in criterion (∗L), and confirmed numerically in Table 2.
I now use the parameterized model to quantify the welfare effects, in terms of consumption
equivalents, of implementing a two-period cycle.23 Figure 3 shows the results for values of
σ between 0 and 10 and different values of α = 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.65, and 0.7. Each graph
(for every α) has a kink at the level of σ as computed in Table 2. For all values of σ below
this level, there is no welfare gain from a cycle. For higher values of σ , the welfare gains
are positive with a maximum level of 0.7%.24 The fact that unemployment cannot be negative
puts an upper bound on the welfare gains.25 The optimal two-period cycle implements zero
unemployment and a small negative tax rate in the low tax period, and in the high tax period
an unemployment level slightly above the time invariant level of 5.6% and a small positive tax
rate. For example, if α = 0.5 and σ = 10, the welfare gain equals 0.64%, the unemployment
rates are 0% and 8.1%, and the tax rates equal −0.3% and 0.1%.
6.2. Frictions in monetary economies
Frictions in the acquisition of money are characterized by a wedge ω which changes the decision
to acquire money, ω = λM
um
. To focus on these specific frictions, I consider a frictionless labour
22. The values of σ are within the range used in the macro literature (McGrattan et al. (1997), Chari et al.
(2002), and Gali et al. (2003) all use substantially higher values).
23. The calibration strategy follows Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
24. The graphs are ordered by α, the elasticity parameter in the matching function. For smaller values of α,
employment becomes more responsive to changes in vacancies (E = m(1, v) = χv1−α) and welfare gains from a
cycle are larger. For example, in the extreme case of α = 1, employment would be constant and policy would be
ineffective, whereas employment would be a linear function of vacancies if α = 0.
25. The inefficiencies (due to 5.6% of households not working) seem to be small relative to the potential
inefficiencies caused by taxation. Prescott (2004) argues that differences in marginal tax rates alone potentially explain
why Americans work 50% more than their German, French, and Italian counterparts.
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Figure 3
Welfare gains from a two-period cycle in a labour search model
market. The elasticity of a function with respect to m, evaluated at the TI solution (hTI,mTI)
(u can be non-separable), is again denoted f . Set μ(ht ,mt ) = um(ht − g, ht ,mt ).
Theorem 8. For a utility function u(ct , ht , mt) and a money acquisition wedge ω, define
μ, μ′, μ, ω′ , ω as before. If mTI < m and RTI > 0 (Friedman rule is not optimal), then
ω′ω
μ
+ 2ω
(
1 + 1
μ
)
+ 2 + μ′ − (μ + ω + 1) < 0 (∗M)
implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A welfare-improving
two-period cycle exists.
A primary role of frictions is to rule out the Friedman rule as an optimal policy. A cycle
requires that a decrease of R (or an increase in m) is feasible, which is the case if the zero
bound on nominal interest rates is not binding. The Friedman rule is, however, a prevalent result
in frictionless economies (Chari and Kehoe, 1999), so that frictions are almost a necessary
condition. A second contribution of frictions is that the wedge changes the shape of the tax
revenue curve. Without frictions and thus with a constant wedge equal to 1, condition (∗M)
would read
1 + μ′ − μ < 0,
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The wedge in Lagos and Wright (2005)
or equivalently, the contribution of frictions is to change this condition by
ω′ω
μ
+ 2ω
(
1 + 1
μ
)
− ω. (32)
A positive wedge (ω > 1) suggests that ω is decreasing and convex, as will be true for the Lagos
and Wright (2005) economy. It is decreasing because the wedge disappears when R converges
to 1 (Friedman rule). This convergence is convex whenever the speed of convergence is slower
the closer R is to the Friedman rule. Interestingly, the same arguments established the shape of
the wedge in the search and matching model. Figure 4 shows the wedge with these properties for
a parameterized version of Lagos and Wright (2005). The contribution of frictions to condition
(∗M) (equation (32)) is then negative, explaining why a cycle is welfare-improving.
I now consider a specific economy, Lagos and Wright (2005), which fits into the framework
developed in Section 3 and makes Theorem 8 applicable. I choose this model because it provides
an analytically tractable framework for dealing with frictions in the acquisition of money (which
arise due to frictions in the product and credit markets).
6.2.1. The Lagos and Wright (2005) monetary model. Every period is divided into
two subperiods. In the first subperiod, agents trade in a frictionless market, the centralized
market (CM), followed by a subperiod with trading frictions, the decentralized market (DM).
With probability α, the household wants to buy a good q in the DM, which gives it utility
u(q); with probability α, the household is a seller with cost function c(q); and with probability
1 − 2α the household does not participate in the DM. Money is needed in all transactions in the
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DM.26 The price and the quantity traded are the outcomes of Nash bargaining with bargaining
power θ for the buyer. The function
z(q) = θc(q)u
′(q) + (1 − θ)u(q)c′(q)
θu′(q) + (1 − θ)c′(q) , (33)
describes how q is monotonically related to money holdings. The precise description of
the environment is presented in the Appendix. I now characterize the set of implementable
allocations, which are, as is standard, equivalently expressed in terms of q instead of in terms
of m (see Aruoba and Chugh, 2006).
Proposition 3. For any (B−1,M−1), an allocation {ct , ht , qt }∞t=0 is implementable if and
only if
Uc(c0)
M−1 + R−1B−1
P0
=
∑
t≥0
βt
{
Uc(ct )ct − Aht + αqt
(
u′(qt )
z,q
− z(qt )
qt
)}
(34)
ct + g = ht (35)
u′(qt )
z′(qt )
≥ 1. (36)
The nominal interest Rt+1 equals α
(
u′(qt )
z′(qt ) − 1
)
+ 1, so that equation (36) is equivalent to
a zero bound on nominal interest rates and government’s seignorage
αqt u
′(qt )
z,q
−αz(qt )
Uc(ct )
= Mt
Pt
Rt−1
Rt
.
Interestingly, z,q is equal to 1 + p,q , where p(q) is the price of the good traded in the DM.
Whenever this price depends on the quantity traded, the shape of the wedge and the tax revenue
curve will change. A non-zero price elasticity is thus a key ingredient for the optimality of a
cycle. In the corresponding Walrasian setting,
λM = α
(
u′(q)
z,q
− z(q)
q
)
(37)
is replaced by the marginal value of q, α(u′ − c′), so that the price elasticity does not play a
role in this case. The wedge ω, which characterizes the frictions, then equals
ω = λ
M
α(u′ − c′) =
u′(qt )
z,q(u′ − c′) −
z(q)
q(u′ − c′) (38)
and the Ramsey allocation maximizes∑
t≥0
βt {U(ct ) − Aht + α(u(qt ) − c(qt ))} (39)
over all implementable allocations.
I now use criterion (∗M) to assess numerically whether a cycle improves welfare, making it
necessary to choose functional forms for U, u and c and values for the remaining parameters.
In the CM I set U(c) = log(c), A = 1/2, and in the DM, the utility function equals u(q) =
26. One can think of “money” as cash (as in Lagos and Wright, 2005) or as bonds (as in Lagos, 2005).
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TABLE 3
Results from the parametrization
θ
qCy
qTI
qTI g
hTI
DM
Y=DM+CM
mTI
hTI+αmTI
∂m
∂R
R
m
g = 0.3, η = 2
0.5 1.225 0.138 0.135 0.026 0.261 −0.213
0.75 1.096 0.199 0.135 0.026 0.262 −0.228
1 1.007 0.272 0.134 0.026 0.261 −0.221
g = 0.4, η = 2
0.5 1.406 0.109 0.170 0.026 0.256 −0.107
0.75 1.192 0.165 0.171 0.026 0.258 −0.128
1 1.041 0.235 0.170 0.026 0.258 −0.140
g = 0.4, η = 1
0.5 1.492 0.131 0.172 0.023 0.226 −0.199
0.75 1.212 0.206 0.173 0.023 0.231 −0.261
1 1.048 0.292 0.172 0.023 0.231 −0.289
Notes: qTI, hTI, and cTI are the TI levels of q, h, and c. qCy is the constant level of q that makes the representative
household indifferent between consumption plans with and without a two-period tax cycle. DM
Y=DM+CM is the fraction
of output Y produced in the DM, mTI
hTI+αmTI is the inverse of money velocity, and
∂m
∂R
R
m
is the elasticity of money
demand.
(q+κ)1−η−κ1−η
1−η + 1, the cost function c(q) = exp(q2/2), κ = 1 and α = 0.1.27 These choices
rule out cycles in the corresponding Walrasian economy.
I then vary the three remaining parameters, η (the curvature parameter of u), θ (the
bargaining power of the buyer), and g (government expenditures).28 Table 3 reports the results
such as the size of the CM, the share of government expenditure and the elasticity of money
demand. The velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand seem to be reasonable
and the size of the government is quite small, between 13% and 17% of CM output. The
time-invariant q is denoted qTI and qCy is the constant level of q that makes the representative
household indifferent between consumption plans with and without a two-period tax cycle.
The percentage gain q
Cy
qTI
of a cycle in terms of DM consumption is quite large. For example,
for g = 0.4 and η = 1 (log preferences), the consumption gain in the DM, qCy
qTI
, is close to
50%. The welfare gain can be expressed also in terms of CM consumption. A household is
indifferent between 3.97% higher consumption in the CM and a two-period cycle. Figure 5
provides more information about how the welfare gains from a two-period cycle vary with η
and θ . The figure shows q
Cy
qTI
as a function of η for θ = 0.5, 0.75, 1 and g = 0.3, 0.4.
As already observed, a higher value of η unambiguously makes a cycle more likely to be
optimal. However, a larger η also makes households more averse to cycles, so that the size
of the cycle eventually diminishes. A lower value of θ (a smaller buyer’s share of the surplus
27. To guarantee existence of an equilibrium in Lagos and Wright (2005) (u(0) = c(0) is finite) it is necessary
to add κ and a 1 to the utility function.
28. These choices could be guided by two observations in the data, the demand elasticity of M and the level of
velocity, i.e. nominal output divided by M . However, these numbers depend on the interpretation of M in the data.
For example, the velocity of bonds is much lower than the velocity of M1. The elasticity of money also depends
on the time period. For example, the correlation between M1/GDP and a short-term nominal interest rate has been
positive for the last 25 years, although previously it was negative.
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Welfare gains from a two-period cycle in Lagos and Wright (2005)
in the DM) leads to less trade in the DM, so that an increase in trade and a cycle are more
valuable.
For this parameterized model, criterion (∗M) can be used to understand the role of frictions.
Table 4 shows the value of this criterion in the LW model and in the corresponding frictionless
economy. As a negative value indicates a cycle, Table 4 establishes that cycles are welfare-
improving only in the model with frictions. The table also demonstrates that this difference
between the two economies with and without frictions is due both to a non-trivial wedge ω
and to the non-zero elasticities of ω and ω′.29
6.3. Summary
A general lesson to be learned from these two classes of economies (with frictions in the labour
market and in money acquisition) is that price formation is key. This lesson can be applied to
other frictions too. Whenever after-tax prices are not equal to the household’s marginal rate of
substitution, the properties of cycles in such an economy differ from those in the corresponding
Walrasian economy. In a search and matching model, the wage is located between productivity
and the marginal rate of substitution. The exact location depends on the form of bargaining,
but usually it does not equal the marginal rate of substitution. In the monetary economy, the
marginal cost of holding money typically is not equal to the marginal benefit of holding money,
λM 	= um. In both cases, tax revenues (but not utility) change and conditions (∗L) and (∗M)
describe why and when this change makes cycles welfare-improving.
29. Aruoba and Chugh (2006) consider optimal taxation in the same model but their choice of functional forms
makes the model with frictions look identical to the Walrasian benchmark. Their critical assumption is that the cost
function is linear, c(q) = q. This choice eliminates price effects z,q = 1 + p,q = 1, and implies that u
′(q)
z,q
− z(q)
q
equals u′(q) − 1 = u′(q) − c′(q), just as in the Walrasian case. Thus ω = 1 and cycles are not improving welfare.
© 2010 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
1064 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
TABLE 4
The role of frictions
θ (∗M) (∗M) (Walras) ω ω,q ω′,q
g = 0.3, η = 2
0.5 −6.065 1.336 12.955 −2.492 −3.022
0.75 −3.226 1.694 11.773 −2.473 −2.890
1 −0.674 2.507 13.497 −2.000 −3.000
g = 0.4, η = 2
0.5 −7.384 1.224 22.822 −2.298 −3.052
0.75 −4.200 1.471 18.402 −2.285 −2.990
1 −1.617 2.020 18.060 −2.000 −3.000
g = 0.4, η = 1
0.5 −8.307 1.244 16.413 −2.222 −3.041
0.75 −4.422 1.526 12.293 −2.217 −2.984
1 −1.774 2.081 11.718 −2.000 −3.000
Another popular deviation from a Walrasian world is monopolistic competition. This
friction drives a wedge between productivity and wages as firms charge a mark-up. However,
monopolistic competition does not change the welfare properties of cycles. The reason is simple.
The implementability constraint takes the same form with or without monopolistic competition
since the after-tax wage does not change or, equivalently, the price of households’ leisure
does not change. Whatever the tax rate on wages or the degree of monopolisitc competition,
households require the same compensation for a given amount of labour. In the notation of the
general framework, λL = − uh
uc
, that is the wedge ω = 1. As a result and consistent with the
general lesson, tax revenues as a function of h do not change and thus cycles do not become
more likely.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper asks whether tax smoothing, as suggested by Barro (1979), or rather tax cycles
represent the solution to a Ramsey taxation problem in models with frictions. There is no
extrinsic uncertainty that would result in cycles.
To study this question, I develop a framework that nests both a frictionless Walrasian
benchmark economy and a large class of models with frictions. Frictions are modelled through
wedges between prices and marginal rates of substitution. These wedges distort agents’
decisions in the labour market and in the product market, and their decisions to acquire money.
I derive a sufficient condition for tax cycles to be welfare-improving in the general framework,
which is then applicable to a Walrasian economy and to a large class of models with frictions.
Through the shape of the wedges characterizing these models, this criterion illustrates the
different welfare properties of tax cycles in models with and without frictions.
Applying the framework to the frictionless benchmark economy, I find that under
sufficiently strongly decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) tax cycles are optimal, whereas
under increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) they are not. I then apply the framework to
two models with frictions. I theoretically characterize the properties of the wedges that result
in cycles for frictions in the labour market, in the product market, and in money acquisition.
Then I consider calibrated examples that are relevant in many models and are nested in my
framework. For a labour search and matching economy and the Lagos and Wright (2005)
monetary economy, I demonstrate how a cycle now becomes optimal for a class of preferences
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that was considered to imply the opposite in a frictionless Walrasian world. Thus the results that
have been established for the Walrasian economy, which guaranteed optimal tax smoothing for
a certain class of preferences, prove not to carry over to a large class of models. Interestingly,
these preferences include constant relative risk aversion, the preference of choice in many
papers. My results suggest the possibility that tax cycles can improve welfare, in particular in
models with frictions.
Another interesting example–not discussed in this paper–where tax cycles are welfare-
improving is considered in Barbie et al. (2009). This paper characterizes optimal redistribution
with a linear labour tax in a frictionless model with heterogenous preferences as in Judd (1985).
We find that a tax cycle implicitly serves as a redistributional device and can improve welfare
even if all agents have CRRA preferences.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof for cycles in labour h and money m are identical. I therefore consider the case
of h only and omit any references to m. First- and second-order derivatives are denoted CU ′ = CUh, CU ′′ = CUhh,
CS ′ = CSh, and CS ′ = CShh.
In principle, four cases have to be considered. Labour supply can be too high (CU ′ < 0) or too low (CU ′ > 0),
and tax revenue can be increasing (CS ′ > 0) or decreasing (CS′ < 0) in h (the case CS′ = 0 is considered below).
Two cases can be ruled out immediately if transfers from the government to the household are allowed for (this means
the implementability constraint becomes an inequality constraint; I use this “trick” later). If CU ′ > 0 and CS′ > 0,
an increase in labour supply is welfare-improving and raises tax revenues. Conversely, if CU ′ < 0 and CS ′ < 0,
a decrease in labour supply is welfare-improving and raises tax revenues. Two cases remain. In Case I, the labour
supply is too low (CU ′ > 0) and cutting taxes decreases tax revenue (CS′ < 0). In Case II, labour supply is too high
(CU ′ < 0) and the economy is on the downside of the Laffer curve, so that lowering taxes increases tax revenue
(CS ′ > 0). In Case I, (∗) is equivalent to
CS ′′
CS ′
(hTI) − CU
′′
CU ′
(hTI) < 0 (∗I )
and in Case II, (∗) is equivalent to
CS ′′
CS ′
(hTI) − CU
′′
CU ′
(hTI) > 0 (∗II).
I use a perturbation argument to show that a TI policy is not optimal. Consider two consecutive periods (t and t + 1)
where the same amount of labour hTI is implemented. In the first period, labour supply is increased by  ≥ 0. In
the second period, labour supply is decreased by δ/β ≥ 0. Let S(, δ) be the present value surplus and V (, δ) the
present value utility from these two periods (evaluated at hTI). Thus
S(, δ) = CS(hTI + ) + β · CS(hTI − δ/β)
V (, δ) = CU(hTI + ) + β · CU(hTI − δ/β).
For small , define δS() and δV () such that
S(, δS()) = 0
V (, δV ()) = 0.
If multiple solutions exist, the smallest δ is chosen. Define δ∗() = (δS() + δV ())/2.
If condition (∗) holds, it will be shown that for small , a joint increase by  in the first period and a decrease by
δ()/β in the second period increase both S and V . An increase in S means that this policy change is implementable
by Proposition 1, while an increase in V means that this policy change is welfare-improving.
Thus let S˜ and B˜ be defined as follows:
S˜() = S(, δ∗())
V˜ () = V (, δ∗()).
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Obviously δ∗(0) = (δS(0) + δV (0))/2 = 0. Implicit differentiation results in:
∂δ∗(·)
∂
(0) = ∂δ
S(·)
∂
(0) = ∂δ
V (·)
∂
(0) = 1
∂2δS(·)
∂∂
(0) = (1 + β) · CS
′′(hTI)
β · CS′(hTI)
∂2δV (·)
∂∂
(0) = (1 + β) · CU
′′(hTI)
β · CU ′(hTI) .
Consider first derivatives with respect to :
∂S˜
∂
= CS′(hTI + ) − CS ′(hTI − δ∗()/β) · δ∗′ () =0= 0,
∂V˜
∂
= CU ′(hTI + ) − CU ′(hTI − δ∗()/β) · δ∗′ () =0= 0.
This shows that a linear approximation does not produce an affirmative answer. Therefore the sign of the second
derivatives is decisive:
∂2S˜
∂∂
= CS′′(hTI + ) + CS ′′(hTI − δ∗()/β)/β · (δ∗′ ())2 − CS ′(hTI − δ∗()/β) · δ∗′′ ()
=0= CS′′(hTI)(1 + β)/β − CS ′(hTI) · δ∗′′ (0)
= (1 + β)/β ·
{
CS′′(hTI) − CS ′(hTI)/2 ·
[
CS′′(hTI)
CS ′(hTI)
+ CU
′′(hTI)
CU ′(hTI)
]}
> (1 + β)/β ·
{
CS ′′(hTI) − CS ′(hTI)/2 ·
[
2 · CS
′′(hTI)
CS ′(hTI)
]}
= 0,
where the inequality sign follows in Case I from (∗I ) and CS′(hTI) < 0, and in Case II from (∗II) and CS′(hTI) > 0.
The same calculations for V result in:
∂2V˜
∂∂
=0= CU ′′(hTI)(1 + β)/β − CU ′(hTI) · δ∗′′ (0)
= (1 + β)/β ·
{
CU ′′(hTI) − CU ′(hTI)/2 ·
[
CS′′(hTI)
CS ′(hTI)
+ CU
′′(hTI)
CU ′(hTI)
]}
> (1 + β)/β ·
{
CU ′′(hTI) − CU ′(hTI)/2 ·
[
2 · CU
′′(hTI)
CU ′(hTI)
]}
= 0,
where the inequality sign again follows in Case I from (∗I ) and CU ′(hTI) > 0, and in Case II from (∗II) and
CU ′(hTI) < 0.
If CS ′ = 0 and CS ′′ = 0 (and condition (∗) is fulfilled), then any (second-order) variation in tax rates, in particular
one that increases utility, increases tax revenues. ‖
Proof of Theorem 2. For a fixed set of (h,m) pairs {(h1,m1), . . . (hn,mn)}, consider the following convexified
problem:
max
π=(π1,...,πn)
n∑
i=1
πiv(hi,mi) (40)
subject to
n∑
i=1
πiγ (hi,mi) = 0 (41)
n∑
i=1
πi = 1 (42)
0 ≤ πi ≤ 1, (43)
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where v(ht ,mt ) = u(ht − g, ht ,mt ) and γ (ht ,mt ) = uc(ht − g, ht ,mt ) · (ht − g − λL(ht )ht ) + λM(mt )mt .
A π is called admissible if it fulfills (41)–(43). It is a standard result in linear programming (see e.g., Dantzig,
1963) that a corner (or vertex or extreme point) solution is optimal, where a corner is defined as follows:
Definition 4. An admissible π = {π1, . . . , πn} is a corner (or vertex or extreme point) if for all admissible
π˜ = {π˜1, . . . , π˜n} and πˆ = {πˆ1, . . . , πˆn} and λ ∈ (0, 1):
π = λπ˜ + (1 − λ)πˆ ⇒ π = π˜ = πˆ . (44)
I show next that for a corner π , at most two πi are not zero. Suppose there is a corner π with a support
larger than 2. Thus there exist three different i (i1, i2, i3) such that πi1 , πi2 , πi3 	= 0. I now define π˜ 	= π and
πˆ 	= π such that 12 π˜ + 12 πˆ = π , i.e. π is not a corner. Note that without loss of generality all γ j := γ (hij ,mij )
(j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) take different values, since for the same γ value, only the h that gives the highest utility is chosen. Define
π˜ i1 = π1 − 
γ2−γ3
γ1−γ3 , π˜ i2 = π2 + , π˜ i3 = π3 − 
γ 1−γ 2
γ 1−γ 3 , πˆ i1 = π1 + 
γ2−γ 3
γ1−γ 3 , πˆ i2 = π2 − , πˆ i3 = π3 + 
γ 1−γ 2
γ 1−γ 3 ,
for some sufficiently small  > 0. For all other indices, π˜ , πˆ and π coincide. Since π˜ and πˆ are admissible and fulfil
1
2 π˜ + 12 πˆ = π , π is not a corner. Thus the solution of the convexified problem has the desired property of a support
not larger than 2.
I now show that this is also the case for the Ramsey problem. Suppose the Ramsey problem implements the
(h,m) pairs (h1,m1) . . . (hn,mn), where (hi ,mi) is implemented at dates Ii := {t | (ht ,mt ) = (hi,mi)}. Define π :
πi := (1 − β)
∑
t∈Ii
βt . (45)
Since the Ramsey solution fulfills the implementability constraint, π is admissible. The above arguments show that
an admissible π˜ exists with a support not larger than 2, which produces the same welfare level. This implies that
(1 − β)
∞∑
t=0
βtv(ht ,mt ) =
n∑
i=1
πiv(h
i, mi) ≤ π˜1v(hi1 ,mi1 ) + π˜2v(hi2 ,mi2 ) (46)
for some 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ n.
I now show that J1, J2 ⊂ N0 exist, such that J1 ∪ J2 = N0 and
(1 − β)
∑
s∈J1
βs = π˜1 and (47)
(1 − β)
∑
s∈J2
βs = π˜2. (48)
The following algorithm achieves this. Define a sequence of index sets J1(t), J2(t) as follows: J1(−1) = J2(−1) = ∅.
J1(t) = J1(t − 1) ∪ {t}, J2(t) = J2(t − 1), if π˜1 − πˆ1(t − 1) ≥ π˜2 − πˆ1(t − 1)
J1(t) = J1(t − 1), J2(t) = J2(t − 1) ∪ {t}, otherwise,
where πˆ i (t) := (1 − β)
∑
s∈Ji (t) β
s and πˆ i (−1) = 0.
J1 := limt→∞ J1(t) and J2 := limt→∞ J2(t).
This algorithm works if π˜ i ≥ πˆ i (t) holds for all t ≥ 0. This is true for t if it is true for t − 1 and if
(1 − β)βt ≤ max{π˜1 − πˆ1(t − 1), π˜2 − πˆ2(t − 1)}. (49)
Since π˜1 + π˜2 = 1, πˆ1(t − 1) + πˆ2(t − 1) = (1 − β)
∑t−1
s=0 β
s = 1 − βt and thus since β > 1/2
π˜1 + π˜2 − πˆ1(t − 1) − πˆ2(t − 1) = βt > 2(1 − β)βt . (50)
The algorithm converges because (50) implies (49) and πˆ i (t) → π˜ i . Thus the same welfare level can be reached with
two different tax levels:
(1 − β)
∞∑
t=0
βtv(ht ,mt ) =
n∑
i=1
πiv(h
i,mi) (51)
≤ π˜1v(hi1 ,mi1 ) + π˜2v(hi2 ,mi2 ) = (1 − β)
⎛
⎝∑
s∈J1
βsv(hi1 ,mi1 ) +
∑
s∈J2
βsv(hi2 , mi2 )
⎞
⎠ .
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An infinite support can be ruled out as follows. Consider the problem truncated at time n. The support of these
problems is not larger than 2. Since the welfare of the solution for n = ∞ is the limit for n → ∞, the optimal
solution can always be approximated by a solution with a finite support (of size 2). ‖
Proof of Theorem 3. The Ramsey problem is to choose ct and ht to maximize utility subject to implementability
and resource constraints. In a first step it is shown that both these constraints can be written as inequalities, such that
the (relaxed) Ramsey problem reads as follows:
Maxct ,ht
∞∑
t=0
βt (w(ct ) − χ(ht ))
s.t.
∑
t≥0
βt (wc(ct ) · ct − χh(ht ) · ht ) ≥ 0
ct + g ≤ ht .
Suppose first that in the (relaxed) maximization problem the resource constraint is fulfilled with strict inequality
for some t . Then decreasing ht improves welfare and still satisfies the relaxed implementability constraint (the
implementability constraint is decreasing in ht ).
Thus the resource constraint is fulfilled with equality for all t , and ct = ht − g.
Suppose now that the implementability constraint is fulfilled with strict inequality. Then for some t :
(wc(ct ) · ct − χh(ht ) · ht ) > 0.
Since ct + g = ht ,:
0 < (wc(ct ) · ct − χh(ht ) · ht )
= wc(ct ) · (ht · (1 − χh(ht )/wc(ct )) − g)
⇒ (1 − χh(ht )/wc(ct )) > 0
⇔ wc(ct ) > χh(ht ).
Thus increasing ht and ct by the same (small) amount improves welfare. The relaxed implementability constraint is
still fulfilled since it was assumed to hold with strict inequality.
These arguments imply that the solution to the relaxed problem fulfills both constraints with equality. Therefore
the solution to the relaxed problem and the solution to the Ramsey problem coincide.
A substitution of variables vt := w(ct ) results in an equivalent maximization problem (P ∗) which reads as follows:
Max
vt ,ht
∞∑
t=0
βt (vt − χ(ht ))
s.t.
∑
t≥0
βt (ϕ(ψ(vt )) − χh(ht ) · ht ) ≥ 0
ψ(vt ) + g ≤ ht
for all feasible vt (those where a ct exists such that vt = u(ct ), ψ(v) = w−1(v) and ϕ(c) = wc(c) · c.
It will be shown that this problem is convex for IRRA utility functions. This amounts to showing that both
constraints are convex. This is true for the resource constraint, since the inverse of any increasing concave utility
function is convex. For the implementability constraint, κ(v) := ϕ(ψ(vt )) has to be a concave function (concave since
the inequality sign is ≥ and not ≤.). χh(ht ) · ht is a convex function by assumption, so that
κ ′′(v) = ϕ′′(ψ ′)2 + ϕ′ψ ′′
= 2w
′′ + w′′′ · c
(w′)2
− (w
′ + w′′c)w′′
(w′)3
= w
′′
(w′)2
(
1 + w
′′′c
w′′
− w
′′c
w′
)
≤ 0
since w is increasing and concave and IRRA is equivalent to
1 + w
′′′c
w′′
− w
′′c
w′
≥ 0.
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Since problem (P ∗) is strictly concave, first-order conditions for every t have a unique solution (v∗t , h∗t ). Since first-
order conditions are necessary for an optimum, (v∗t , h∗t ) is the optimal choice at t . Furthermore, since the maximization
problem is identical for all t , the same (v∗, h∗) is implemented in every period t . As problem (P ∗) is equivalent to
the Ramsey problem, (c∗ := w−1(v∗), h∗) is the optimal choice in every period. ‖
Proof of Theorems 4, 5 and 6. Follow from Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7. It holds that
CU ′ = μ − χ
CU ′′ = μ′ − χ ′
CS ′ = μ′c + μc′ − ω′χh − ωχ ′h − ωχ
CS ′′ = 2μ′c′ + μ′′c + μc′′ − ω′′χh − ω′χ ′h − ω′χ − ω′χ ′h − ωχ ′′h − 2ωχ ′ − ω′χ.
Define the consumption output ratio as 1 − τ˜ = c
h
, which equals ωχ
μ
since CS = 0. It then holds that
CS ′
CU ′
= μ
′c + μc′ − ω′χh − ωχ ′h − ωχ
μ − χ
= (1 − τ˜ )μ + c
′ − ω(1 − τ˜ ) − χ (1 − τ˜ ) − (1 − τ˜ )
1 − χ
μ
= 1 − τ˜

(μ − 1 + c − ω − χ )
since
χ ′
μ′
= χ
μ
(1 − )
CS ′′
CU ′′
= μ
′′c + μ′c′ + μ′c′ + μc′′ − ω′′χh − 2ω′χ ′h − 2ω′χ − ω′χ ′h − ωχ ′′h − 2ωχ ′
μ′ − χ ′
=
(1 − τ˜ ){μ′ + c(2 +

c′
μ
) − ω′ ω
μ
− 2 ωχ
μ
− 2 ω
μ
− χ ′ χ
μ
− 2 χ
μ
}
1 − χ
μ
(1 − )
= (1 − τ˜ ) μ′μ + c(2μ + c′ ) − ω′ω − 2ωχ − 2ω − χ ′χ − 2χ
μ − χ (1 − ) .
Dividing by (1 − τ˜ ) shows that the criterion CS′′
CU ′′ − CS
′
CU ′ < 0 equals (∗L). ‖
Proof of Proposition 2. The household’s present value budget constraint reads as follows:
B−1 =
∑
t≥0
qt · {ct − It · Et }. (52)
From the free-entry condition k = m(1,vt )
vt
1
2 (1 − b1−τ t ), it follows that
(1 − τ t ) =
b
2 m(1, vt )/vt
1
2m(1, vt )/vt − κ
. (53)
Income then equals
It = 12 (1 − τ t ) +
1
2
b (54)
= 1
2
b
2 m(1, vt )/vt
1
2m(1, vt )/vt − κ
+ 1
2
b (55)
= b
2
{
1 +
1
2m(1, vt )/vt
1
2 m(1, vt )/vt − κ
}
(56)
= b
2
{
m(1, vt )/vt − κ
1
2 m(1, vt )/vt − κ
}
. (57)
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The proposition follows since the consumption Euler equation implies that
qt = βt · uc(t)uc(0) and Et = m(1, vt ). ‖
Proof of Theorem 8. It holds that
CU ′ = μ
CU ′′ = μ′
CS ′ = ω′μm + ωμ′m + ωμ
CS ′′ = ω′′μm + 2ω′μ′m + ωμ′′m + 2ω′μ + 2ωμ′.
It then follows that
CS′
CU ′
= ω
′μm + ωμ′m + ωμ
μ
= ω′m + ωμ
′m
μ
+ ω
= ω(ω + μ + 1)
and
CS ′′
CU ′′
= ω
′′μm + 2ω′μ′m + ωμ′′m + 2ω′μ + 2ωμ′
μ′
= ω
(
ω′ω
μ
+ 2ω
(
1 + 1
μ
)
+ 2 + μ′
)
.
Dividing by ω shows that the criterion CS′′
CU ′′ − CS
′
CU ′ < 0 equals (∗M).
Acknowledgements. I would like to thank the editor, three anonymous referees, and Dirk Kru¨ger, Stefan Niemann,
Fabrizio Zilibotti, and the seminar participants at the University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments and suggestions
that have been incorporated throughout the paper. Support from the National Centre of Competence in Research
“Financial Valuation and Risk Management” (NCCR FINRISK) and the Research Priority Program on Finance and
Financial Markets of the University of Zurich is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
AIYAGARI, R. S. (1994), “Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing Constraints, and
Constant Discounting” (Working Paper No. 508, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis).
ARUOBA, B. and CHUGH, S. (2006), “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy When Money is Essential” (Mimeo,
University of Maryland).
BARBIE, M., HAGEDORN, M. and KAUL, A. (2009), “Optimal Redistributive Cycles” (Mimeo, University of
Zurich).
BARRO, R. J. (1979), “On the Determination of the Public Debt”, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 940–971.
CHAMLEY, C. (1986), “Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives”,
Econometrica, 54 (3), 607–622.
CHARI, V. V. and KEHOE, P. (1999), “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy”, in Taylor, J. and Woodford, M. (eds.)
Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland).
CHARI, V. V., KEHOE, P. and MCGRATTAN, E. (2002), “Can Sticky Price Models Generate Volatile and Persistent
Real Exchange Rates?” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 533–563.
CHARI, V. V., KEHOE, P. and MCGRATTAN, E. (2007), “Business Cycle Accounting”, Econometrica, 75, 781–836.
GALI, J., GERTLER, M. and LOPEZ-SALIDO, J. (2003), “Markups, Gaps, and the Welfare Costs of Business
Fluctuations” (NBER Working Paper W8850).
GOLLIER, C. (2001), The Economics of Risk and Time (Cambridge: MIT Press).
HAGEDORN, M. and MANOVSKII, I. (2008), “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
Revisited”, American Economic Review, 98 (4), 1692–1706.
HALL, R. E. and MILGROM, P. R. (2008), “The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain”,
American Economic Review, 98 (4), 1653–1674.
HANSEN, G. (1985), “Indivisible Labour and the Business Cycle”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 16, 309–327.
© 2010 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
HAGEDORN RAMSEY TAX CYCLES 1071
HASSLER, J., KRUSELL, P., STORESLETTEN, K. and ZILIBOTTI, F. (2008), “On the Optimal Timing of Capital
Taxes”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 55 (4), 692–709.
HUNGERB ¨UHLER, M., LEHMANN, E., PARMENTIER, A. and VAN DER LINDEN, B. (2006), “Optimal
Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model”, Review of Economic Studies, 73 (3), 743–767.
JUDD, K. (1985), “Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model”, Journal of Public Economics,
28 (1), 59–83.
LAGOS, R. (2005), “Asset Prices and Liquidity in an Exchange Economy” (Mimeo, New York University).
LAGOS, R. and WRIGHT, R. (2005), “A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis”, Journal of
Political Economy, 113 (3), 463–484.
LUCAS, R. E. J. (1987), Models of Business Cycles (New York: Basil Blackwell).
LUCAS, R. E. J. and STOKEY, N. L. (1983), “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital”,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 12 (1), 55–93.
MCGRATTAN, E., ROGERSON, R. and WRIGHT, R. (1997), “An Equilibrium Model of the Business Cycle with
Household Production and Fiscal Policy”, International Economic Review, 38 (2), 267–290.
MIRRLEES, J. (1971), “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation”, Review of Economic Studies,
38, 175–208.
OGAKI, M. and ZHANG, Q. (2001), “Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion and Tests of Risk Sharing”, Econometrica,
69 (2), 515–526.
PISSARIDES, C. (1985), “Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment, Vacancies and Real Wages”, American
Economic Review, 75, 676–690.
PISSARIDES, C. (2000), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press).
PRESCOTT, E. C. (2004), “Why do Americans Work so Much More than Europeans”, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 28 (1), 2–13.
SHIMER, R. (2005), “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies”, American Economic
Review, 95 (1), 25–49.
VISSING-JORGENSON, A. (2002), “Limited Asset Market Participation and the Elasticity of Intertemporal
Substitution”, Journal of Political Economy, 110, 825–853.
© 2010 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
